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Secondly, the implication of the case is that even though
a general power of appointment exists which the donee
could exercise in his will in favor of his creditors, if instead, he appoints the property to volunteers, his creditors
will not be allowed to reach the property in satisfaction of
their claims. However, since this latter point has never
been presented to the Court where it recognized and acknowledged that it was dealing with such a general power,
there is a possibility that the Court will in the future
overrule its earlier statements on the matter and follow
the majority view holding in favor of the creditors.
A quaere might be raised as to whether the Court ultimately might not repudiate the Dampman case and recognize the possibility of a general power under language
such as used in the Wyeth and Dampman cases regardless
of whether donor and donee are the same person, and thus
be completely in accord with authority elsewhere. This
should depend on whether there is a real distinction in the
policy behind the interpretation of such powers according to identity of donor and donee.
APPEALS BY THE STATE IN CRIMINAL CASES
State v. Mariana'
Defendant-appellee was indicted on charges of illegal
betting and selling books and pools on races. On the
day of the trial, but before the trial began, he moved the
Criminal Court that the papers obtained by a search of2
his house in violation, as he alleged, of the Bouse Act
be suppressed as evidence and their use at the trial prohibited. Over the objection of the State, the motion was
received and granted, and, in the subsequent trial, the
State being without evidence, the defendant was acquitted.
The State appealed on the ground that the defendant's
motion should not have been received and ruled on before trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
awarded a new trial, pointing out that they had previously decided, in Sugarman v. State,' that the practice of
'174 Md. 85, 197 A. 620 (1938).
Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 35. Sec. 4A, which is the Maryland statute rendering inadmissible, in misdemeanor cases, any evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure, in violation of the Declaration of Rights,
or the use of which would amount to self-incrimination.
The practice of moving before trial
a 173 Md. 52, 195 A. 324 (1937).
to suppress and to obtain the return of evidence obtained by unconstitutional search and seizure does prevail in the Federal courts under the
I
Federal version of the rule against the use of such evidence.
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suppressing evidence before trial was not founded on any
statute and was not supported by precedent of this State
and the Court saw no reason for adopting it. That statement was intended as an adjudication in effect excluding the practice from the courts of this State, and the action contrary to it in the present case was an error requiring a reversal of judgment.
This case is of interest not at all for what it decided, but for what, without any hesitancy or discussion,
it assumed, namely the right of the State to appeal after
a judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial. What is the
basis for the right of the State to appeal in criminal cases?
How is the assumption of the principal case to be interpreted in the light of previous decisions of the Maryland
Court of Appeals? What effect will this case have on future criminal trials in Maryland?
None of these questions can be decided with any certainty by reason of the fact that the issue of the right of
the State to appeal was never raised. In effect, what happened was that the State took an appeal from the lower
Court's ruling in order that the Court of Appeals might
give a declaratory decision on the Maryland rule in regard to the pre-trial motion to exclude evidence under
the Bouse Act, and that is all that they decided. Defendant's counsel made no objection to the Court's extraordinary action in entertaining an appeal by the State after
an acquittal, and not once is the question of the right behind that action ever mentioned. The Court's very brief
decision merely emphasized what it had said in the case
of Sugarman v. State, and it left unanswered the numerous
questions that arise in the mind of one reading the record of State v. Mariana.
The first reported case in which the Court decided the
issue of the right of the State to take an appeal was State
v. Buchanan et al.4 The State brought a writ of error over
the objection of the defendant, after a judgment for the
defendant on demurrer to the indictment. The Court said,
in reversing the lower court, that it could see no reason
that the State should not be entitled to a writ of error.
It cited in support of its proposition several unreported
cases in Maryland and from Hale's Pleas to the Crown to
the effect:
'5 H. & J. 317, 500, 9 Am. Dec. 534 (1821).
5 Hale's Pleas to the Crown, 247.
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"That if A be indicted for murder or other felony
and plead nul cul, and a special verdict be found, and the
court do erroneously judge it to be no felony, yet so
long as that judgment stands unreversed by writ of
error, if the person be indicted de novo, he may plead
autrefois acquit, and shall be discharged; but if the
judgment be reversed, the party may be indicted de
novo."
The Court reasoned from this that Hale had meant that
the judgment could be reversed by writ of error. The
rule of this case that the State is entitled to an appeal from
a ruling on demurrer in favor of the defendant is a reasonable one based on the fact that there has been no trial
on the merits, but merely a ruling on the validity of the
indictment. Inasmuch as the State could under present
practice draw a new and valid indictment and bring the
accused to trial for the same crime,6 why should the State
be prevented from appealing the ruling on demurrer?
Later decisions have followed the rule of this case,7 and
it has been regarded as settled law in Maryland that the
State may appeal from the ruling of the lower Court either
sustaining the defendant's motion to quash or entering
judgment for the defendant on demurrer.
In the case of State v. Scarborough"the State's appeal
was allowed on the trial court's action in overruling the
State's demurrer to the plea of the defendant that the
grand jury which had returned the indictment was incompetent to act. The assignment of errors was dismissed
because it was not drawn in compliance with the statutory
requirements. It appears from this case that the State's
right to appeal extends not only to the ruling on the defendant's demurrer to the indictment, but also to any adverse ruling on the pleadings. This rule must be limited,
however, by the Court's statement that, as is so for civil
cases, appeal can only be taken from a final judgment,9
and that when one good count remains in an indictment
6 Kenny v. State, 121 Md. 120, 87 A. 1109 (1913);

HOCHHEIME,

CRaM-

INAL LAW (2d ed. 1904) Sec. 118.

'State v. McNally and Myers, 55 Md. 559 (1880)
State v. Camper. 91
Md. 672, 47 A. 1027 (1900) ; State v. Tag. 100 Md. 588. 60 A. 465 (1905) ;
State v. King, 124 Md. 491, 92 A. 1041 (1915) ; and State v. Gregg, 163 Md.
353, 163 A. 119 (1932).
8 5 5 Md. 345 (1881).
o State v. Tag, 100 Md. 588, 60 A. 465 (1905) ; and State v. Floto, 81 Md.

600, 6029, 32 A. 315, 316 (1895).
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the sustaining of the defendant's demurrer to any other
counts in the indictment is not such a final judgment.1 0
We come now to several Maryland cases directly on the
question of the right of the State to appeal after a verdict
of acquittal in the lower court. The first of these was
State v. Shields." The State took an appeal after a verdict of acquittal on an indictment charging forgery; the
only exceptions given as grounds for the appeal being
three adverse rulings on the admission of certain testimony. The Court dismissed the appeal in strong terms,
stating:
"It has always been a settled rule of the common
law that after an acquittal of a party upon a regular
trial on an indictment for either a felony or a misdemeanor, the verdict of acquittal can never afterward,
on the application of the prosecutor, in any form of
proceeding, be set aside and a new trial granted, and
it matters not whether such verdict be the result of
a misdirection of the Judge on a question of law, or
of a misconception of fact on the part of the Jury...."
12
Under the statute governing appeals in criminal cases
the Court of Appeals will "notice exceptions by the State,
in criminal cases, on appeals by the State, only in cases
where the parties accused have been
convicted, and have
13
also taken exceptions and appeals.'
The Court of Appeals in the case of Bell v. State4 said,
in speaking of the right of the court to instruct the jury
as to the law in criminal cases: "If the jury disregard it
(the Court's instructions) and convict, the evil can be remedied by a new trial. But if they should acquit, in disregard of it there seems to be no remedy."
This same line of thought was followed in the later
case of Cochran v. State5 in which the accused was tried
under an indictment containing ten counts and was found
guilty under two of them, and himself appealed. The
Court held that the appeal dealt exclusively with the two
counts under which the accused had been found guilty,
quoting the statement above from the Shields case as the
10 State v. Gregg, 163 Md. 353. 163 A. 119 (1932).
1149 Md. 301 (1878).
12Md. Code (1924) Art. 5. Sec. 86.
1049
Md. 301, 306 (1878).
"57 Md. 108, 120 (1881).
16119 Mfd. 539, 87 A. 400 (1913). See also State v. King, 124 Md. 491,
496, 92 A. 1041, 1043 (1915) ; and Birkenfeld v. State, 104 Md. 253, 65 A.
1 (1906).
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basis of that holding. Thus again the State was prevented
from appealing after a verdict of acquittal, even when the
defendant was found guilty under other counts in the same
indictment.
From the cases here discussed, excluding for the moment the principal case, it would appear that the Maryland rule in regard to appeals by the State in criminal
cases might be briefly stated: The State may only take an
appeal in criminal cases from a final judgment given on
defendant's demurrer to the indictment or on other rulings
on the pleadings adverse to the State or on the sustaining of the defendant's motion to quash the indictment.
In all other cases after a regular trial on a valid indictment the Court of Appeals will take notice of and review
the State's writ of error only when after a verdict of guilty,
the defendant appeals and brings error, and even then
the State's exceptions must relate to the count or charge
appealed from by the defendant.
At first glance the case of State v. Williams 6 appears
very similar to the present case. The defendant was indicted for forgery and pleaded not guilty. After the jury
was sworn the defendant took an objection to the indictment which the Court sustained. Thereupon the State
moved to quash the indictment. Motion was refused and
exactly what happened at this point is difficult to determine, but the record reads that the defendant was acquitted. The State's appeal was allowed and the Court
said that the State's motion should have been granted,
but as the error relied on was not set out in the record,
the lower court's verdict was affirmed. The situation was
one of an appeal by the State after a verdict of acquittal
and the Court indicated that it would have reversed if the
State's appeal had been correctly drawn, but it must be
noticed that the error relied on was the failure to grant the
State's motion to quash its own indictment. So in reality,
the trial by which the defendant was acquitted was founded on an invalid indictment and should not have occurred
at all. Hence, while this case superficially appears an
exception to the rule as above stated, actually it is not,
in that it does not fulfil the condition of the rule stating
that the trial which results in the acquittal of the defendant must be founded upon a valid indictment.
Again we are reduced to the statement that there is
no basis in the law of Maryland for the State to take an
-05 Md. 82 (1853).
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appeal after a regular trial upon a valid indictment which
results in a verdict and judgment of acquittal.
What then is the effect of the principal case of State
v. Mariana? A review of the Maryland cases indicates
that it is not based on any previous practice of the State.
In fact, the appeal allowed is in direct opposition to the
statement made in the previous case of State v. Shields,
as quoted with approval in Cochran v. State, to the effect
that, after an acquittal of a party upon a regular trial on
a valid indictment, verdict can never afterward be set
aside and a new trial granted.
Is this remarkable case to be treated as a reversal of
this principle of law stated and affirmed in all previous
cases? Or may it be distinguished? It seems highly probable that the Maryland Court of Appeals will not treat
this case as completely reversing its previous stand. Certainly, the question should be thoroughly considered and
not decided incidentally to a point of court procedure.
The instant case may be distinguished easily on its facts
and to treat it as reversing well established law without
discussion would have unfortunate results.
Inasmuch as the right of the State to appeal was never
objected to by the defendant or even mentioned by the
Court, this case might be regarded as only a declaratory
judgment for the direction of the lower court in regard
to the procedural question directly decided. This is a
practice that is followed by the courts of some states and
is of invaluable assistance to the trial courts.17 It would
be particularly apt to apply this practice to Maryland because of the extreme scarcity of appellate decisions in criminal cases, occasioned by our peculiar constitutional provision making
the jury the judges of the law as well as
8
the fact.'
However, before so classing this case, it must be noted
that it is not in form a declaratory decision. The Court
by its direction at the end of the case ("reversed, and
a new trial awarded") seemed to envisage further action
in this case. In view of this statement, this question pre172 Am. Jur. 984, Appeal and Error, Sec. 227; Miller, Appeals by the
State in Crim4nl Cases (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 486, 487. On Appeals by the
State in general, see ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939) 5577, reviewed (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 214.
Is Aid. Const., Art. 15, Sec. 5. See, for a discussion of this, Book Review (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 214; and Note, Difficulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings on Substantive Crinminal Law--oroboration of Accomplices
(1937) 1 Aid. L. Rev. 175, noting Folb v. State, 169 Md. 209, 181 A. 225
(1935).
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sents itself, has the defendant by allowing the appeal to
be taken without objection on his part, waived his right
to object to a later new trial? By the decisions here discussed it would seem that he did have that right, but what
was the effect of his action in not raising the issue? The
State in its appeal practically admitted that the evidence
had been seized in violation of the Bouse Act, so the evidence produced at the first trial could not be used in a
subsequent one; but, presuming the State found new evidence or the ruling on the admissibility of the old was
changed, could the State re-try this same defendant on
the same indictment for the same crime and have him
found guilty? Might not the defendant, by his conduct
in allowing the appeal when he could have objected by
motion to dismiss, be estopped from denying the obvious
aftermath of a reversal-the new trial? No further action
has been taken on the part of the State in the principal
case and no likelihood exists that any will be, but this is
an interesting possibility. A definite problem of double
jeopardy is raised by the possibility.' 9
This appeal was based on error in the pre-trial proceeding and, reasoning by analogy, this might be treated
as a proceeding similar to the appeal from a ruling on the
pleadings. Assuming that to be possible, if the State had
stopped its proceedings at that point and had suffered a
19But, for that matter, Is the rule against double jeopardy, as now set up
in Maryland, any objection to either a legislative or a judicial rule permitting appeals by the State after acquittal and subsequent new trials
if the State obtains a reversal? The rule against double jeopardy in
Maryland law is only a common law one, and subject to change either
by legislation or by judicial reversal.
The double jeopardy provision of the Federal Constitution does not apply to the State Courts. See Note, Eotent to Which Rights Secured by the
First Eight Amendments to the Federal Constitution Are Protected Against
State Action by the Fourteenth Amendment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 174, noting Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 82 L. Ed. 288, 58 S. Ct.
149 (1937), a case upholding (under Federal constitutional law) the Connecticut practice of re-trying a defendant after reversal obtained upon
State's appeal.
There Is no double jeopardy provision in the Maryland constitution.
Opportunity Is here availed of to correct an error (an editorial one, and
not one by the author) whereby the Maryland constitution was mistakenly
credited with such a provision. See Effect of Acquittal for Assault on Trial
for Murder When Victim Subsequently Dies (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 184,
185, noting Crawford v. State, 174 Md. 175, 197 A. 866 (1938).
In that
casenote an editorial query on the author's manuscript concerning the
possible presence of a Maryland constitutional provision was translated
by the typist into a statement to the effect that one did exist. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland had shortly before fallen Into the same error
In Friend v. State. 175 Md. 352, 356, 2 A. (2d) 430, 432 (1938) where the
opinion stated that a certain practice would 'be double jeopardy and thus
violative of "our constitutional provisions."
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judgment of not guilty before the trial of the defendant,
this analogy might be tenable. But this the State did not
do. It allowed the case to go to trial on the merits; and
to allow the appeal was to proceed in direct opposition
to the decisions here discussed.
If we analogize the trial court's ruling suppressing the
illegally obtained evidence in advance of trial to a ruling
excluding evidence offered by the State during the trial,
then the appeal by the State would seem improper under
the Shields and Cochran cases, which cases, in effect, permit trial courts to commit all the error they please (during the trial) which is favorable to defendants.
On the other hand, if we analogize the trial court ruling in the instant case to a ruling denying the State the
right to go to trial under the indictment, as when an indictment is quashed or a demurrer to it is sustained, then
allowing the State to appeal is consistent with the previous cases. As matters stand, the trial court ruling was
not exactly either. In effect it deprived the State of the
chance to go to trial under the indictment, as it deprived
the State of all its evidence. But on the surface the State
was appealing from a judgment of not guilty after a trial.
There is another, similar problem of the right of the
State to appeal in a borderline situation. Suppose a trial
court, in a criminal case in Maryland, directs a verdict of
not guilty. May the State appeal from a judgment entered
upon such a verdict? The Court of Appeals has said that
a criminal trial court in Maryland has2 no power to direct
a verdict of not guilty, in these words: 1
under the Constitution of Maryland,2 the
jury is the sole judge of the law and the facts, and
this court has repeatedly declined to usurp this function, either by passing upon the question of the legal
sufficiency of all testimony to establish the crime of
which the accused is charged, or by permitting the
court at nisi prius22 thus indirectly, but decisively, to
invade an exclusive constitutional prerogative of the
jury."
Of course, the trial courts (in the counties) and the
Supreme Bench (in Baltimore City) have the power to
prevent accused defendants from ever being convicted by
20 Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 158, 167 A. 60 (1933).
21

Md. Const., Art. 15, Sec. 5.

", Italics supplied.
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granting new trials every time a jury returns a verdict of
guilty. And there is no appeal by the State from such
a ruling. But this is somewhat different from directing
a verdict of not guilty, because after judgment on the
latter the defendant could not again be tried. There is
more at stake if that can be done and so there is more
reason for allowing the State to appeal from such a direction, which would be error regardless of the merits of
the case.
But it is not so clear that the State would have any
more right to appeal from such an erroneous direction
than it probably had in the Mariana case where the right
to appeal was, apparently, conceded by the traverser. To
be sure, we might analogize the trial court's error in directing a verdict of not guilty to a complete denial of the
State's right to try the case and thus an appeal would lie
as readily as from a quashing of an indictment. But, on
the other hand, if a trial court has the power to prevent
a defendant's being convicted by excluding, at trial, every
bit of evidence and testimony offered by the State, howsoever intrinsically erroneous this may be, why can it not
also commit error with impunity by directing a verdict of
not guilty? If the State is impotent in the former regard,
why not in the latter?
In the last analysis, the Mariana case should be analogized to the Folb case2" where, too, the Court went out of
its way to give a ruling desirable to be made, but one not
necessary to be made for a decision of the case. There
the defendant appealed and raised a point of the substantive law of the crime in question. The Court said the
point amounted to a request to them to decide the sufficiency of the evidence, which they could not touch, but
that if the problem had been before them they would have
decided it in a certain way. Thus by dictum it was made
possible to obtain an appellate ruling on a point of substantive criminal law, otherwise difficult to obtain in the
Maryland practice. 4
And so it was in the Mariana case. Unless the State
was allowed to appeal from such a pre-trial ruling (by
appealing after acquittal) there was no effective sanction
to compel the trial court to follow the rule of the Sugarman case that the Bouse Act is to be implemented by ex28 169

Md. 209, 181 A. 225 (1935), noted (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 175.
24 Ibid.
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clusion of evidence at trial rather than by motion to suppress made in advance.
The Marianacase was uncontested on the point of the
right of the State to appeal. It would be interesting to
have a similar case which would be contested on the point
and to see how the Court would rule on a motion to dismiss the appeal. For to come out squarely in favor of
the right of the State to appeal in the Mariana case situation (or in that of the directed verdict of not guilty)
would be to leave but two alternatives. One would be
to create a difficult question of double jeopardy. The other
would be to allow the appeal, as a way of getting a declaratory ruling, without allowing a re-trial of defendant
after reversal. This latter would be foreign to our traditions in the matter.
And yet there seems no other device 25 for compelling
trial courts to follow the rule of the Sugarman case.
But to deny the right to appeal would be consonant with
the rule, applicable to other points, that trial courts have
the power (if not the right) to commit all the errors they
may wish if the errors are favorable to defendants.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON SCIRE FACIAS IN
BALTIMORE CITY
O'Neill & Co., Inc. v. Schulze1
Plaintiff-appellant obtained a judgment against defendant-appellee and fourteen years later caused a writ of
scire facias to be issued out of the Superior Court of Baltimore City to revive it. The writ was issued on June 27,
1938 and made returnable July 11. On the day of its issue the sheriff read it to defendant but did not leave a
copy of it. There was evidence that it had not been the
practice of the Superior Court to make copies of writs of
26 Did the common law writ of prohibition from a higher court to a
lower one prevail in Maryland, this would be one way of undoing such a
pre-trial error by a trial court. There Is apparently no authority for the
use of the writ In Maryland and, in fact, the Court of Appeals has decided
that it has no original jurisdiction in the course of holding unconstitutional a statute purporting to confer habeas corpus powers on it as a
Court, Sevinskey v. Wagus et ux, 76 Md. 335, 25 A. 468 (1892). In that
case, by dictum, it was also Indicated that mandamus powers could not
be conferred on nor exercised by the Court. By the same logic, the writ
of prohibition is not available, either.
2 7 A. (2d) 263 (Md. 1939).

